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by Peter Westen
Professor of Law
The University of Michigan

The U.S. Supreme Court on January 14 heard oral
argument in a case that has both specific and general
significance for law students: specific, because it teaches us
something about the particular meaning of double jeopardy
in death penalty cases; general, because in doing so it tells
us something about the nature of legal rules and, hence,
about the ends of legal education.
The case, Bullington v. Missouri, asks whether a
defendant who was convicted and originally sentenced to
life imprisonment for a capital offense may be resentenced
to death if he is now re convicted following the reversal of
his original conviction. The facts in Bullington are starkly
simple. Robert Bullington, a white male, was charged with
breaking into Pamela Sue Wright's home with a shotgun,
binding three members of her family, abducting the 18-year
old girl by force and later murdering her. Bullington was
found guilty by a jury and, following a subsequent and
separate sentencing hearing, sentenced by the jury to life
imprisonment. The trial judge granted his motion for a new
trial based on the ground that the Missouri procedure for
excusing women from jury service violated Bullington's
right to be tried by a jury drawn from a cross section of the
community. Prior to retrial. the prosecutor filed notice of
intent once again to seek the death penalty. The trial judge
struck the prosecutor's notice-, ruling that resentencing
Bullington to death would violate the double jeopardy
clause. The prosecutor took an immediate appeal, the
Missouri supreme court ruled in his favor, and the U.S.
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The key to the case is North Carolina v. Pearce, 1 holding
that a defendant who was originally sentenced to 12 years in
prison could be resentenced to 15 years in prison upon
retrial following a reversal of his original conviction. To
• decide whether Bullington is like Pearce or different from it
for double jeopardy purposes, one must first possess a
standard for measuring likeness and difference. That is to
say, in order to decide whether one double jeopardy case is
like another, or different from it, one must identify the
standards or values that inform the double jeopardy
guarantee.
As I have suggested elsewhere, 2 the double jeopardy
clause safeguards three separate constitutional values, each
possessing its own particular weight: (1) the integrity of jury
verdicts of not guilty, (2) the faithful administration of
prescribed sentences, and (3) the defendant's interest in
repose. To resolve Bullington- indeed, to resolve any
double jeopardy problem-one must, first, determine
which of the three respective values is implicated and,
second, assess the strength of the state's interests in light of
the particular weight the respective value enjoys.
Given the foregoing standards, Pearce was a relatively
easy case from the prosecution's standpoint, because values
(1) and (2) were not implicated at all, while the third value
of repose was weighted in favor of the state. The contrary is
true of Bullington: the defendant in Bullington invokes two
of the double jeopardy values- i.e., the conclusiveness of
jury verdicts of not guilty, and an interest in repose- and
both are weighted in his favor.
Jury Verdicts of Not Guilty

[Editor's Note: Prof. Westen wrote "Death and Double
Jeopardy" for a January, 1981, issue of Res Gestae, the
Michigan Law School student newspaper. The subject of
the article, Bullington v. Missouri, was argued to the U.S.
Supreme Court on Jan. 14, 1981 . The Supreme Court has
since decided Bullington, holding on May 4, 1981, that the
defendant could not be sentenced to death following his
earlier sentence of life imprisonment.]

The Court has said that the most "fundamental" of double
jeopardy values is that jury acquittals (including implicitly
acquitting a defendant of a greater offense by solely
convicting him of a lesser offense) are "absolutely final"
and may not subsequently be set aside, even if the
acquittals are "egregiously erroneous." 3 Yet the Court also
ruled in Pearce that a sentencing judge's decision to give a
defendant a 12-year sentence is not an "implicit acquittal"
of any greater sentence and, thus, doest preclude a judge
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from subsequently increasing the sentence to 15 years
following retrial and reconviction. More importantly, the
Court has reaffirmed the rule first announced in the 1919
case of Robert Stroud, the famous "Bird Man of Alcatraz,"
that a defendant who is convicted and sentenced to life
imprisonment by a jury in a unitary proceeding may be
resentenced by a jury to death following a reversal of his
original conviction.4
Once again, in order to decide whether Bullington is
governed by the rule against retrial following an implicit
acquittal on the one hand, or by the rule of Pearce and
Stroud on the other hand, one must first identify the
constitutional value that underlies the acquittal rule.
Fortunately, the Court last year cast light on the issue by
suggesting that the prohibition on retrial following an
acquittal "is based on a jury's prerogative to acquit against
the evidence. "s That is, the absolute finality of jury
acquittals is based on the unreviewable authority of sixth
amendment juries to dispense mercy in the face of clear
evidence of guilt.
Now that we have identified the constitutional value
underlying the acquittal rule, we can see that Bullington is

distinguishable from Pearce, because while sentencing in
Pearce involved a decision as to where to draw a somewhat
arbitrary line between one and 15 years in prison, the
sentencing in Bullington involved the starkest of either/or
decisions : the decision between life imprisonment or death.
Finally, Bullington is also distinguishable from Stroud for
purposes of jury nullification and, hence, for purposes of
the acquittal rule. Although Bullington and Stroud both
involved jury choices between death and life
imprisonment, the structure of their decisionmaking was
very different. The Stroud jury, acting without standards or
guidelines and proceeding without instructions regarding
burden of proof, was allowed to exercise unbridled
discretion at the close of a unitary proceeding in making its
choice between death and life imprisonment. The
Bullington jury, in contrast, was directed to act in the
fashion of a jury making a traditional determination of guilt
or innocence: it was required to make its decision at a
separate adversary hearing on the basis of detailed deathpenalty standards and instructions regarding the
prosecution's burden of proof. These differences are
significant because just as the jury's nullification

significantly different for double jeopardy purposes from
both Pearce and Stroud. It is different from Pearce, because
the principle of jury nullification that informs the acquittal
rule is an aspect of a defendant's sixth amendment right to
trial by jury and does not extend to favorable rulings by a
trial judge. Thus, while the acquittal rule presumptively
applies to the jury's favorable choice of life sentence in
Bullington, the rule has no relevance at all to the trial
judge's original 12-year sentence in Pearce.
Moreover, even if Pearce had been sentenced by a jury to
12 years, the implicit-acquittal rule would not have
operated to render his sentence final, because the jury's
prerogative of nullification does not extend to ordinary
sentencing decisions. 6 The difference between
determinations of guilt or innocence (to which the jury's
prerogative of nullification applies) and ordinary
sentencing (to which nullification does not apply) is that
decisions regarding guilt or innocence are either/or
decisions, while decisions regarding length of sentence are
line-drawing decisions on a continuous spectrum of nearly
infinite possibilities. By that standard, Bullington is again

prerogative is confined to either/or decisions regarding
culpability, it also appears to be confined to determinations
of culpability on which the jury's discretion is guided and
focused by separate submissions of evidence, specific
standards of culpability, and instructions on burdens of
proof.
To conclude, while Bullington and Stroud both involved
capital sentencing by juries, they are significantly different
from one another for double jeopardy purposes, because
the determination by the Bullington jury was identical to
the traditional judgments of culpability made by juries
possessing nullification authority, while the procedures
followed in Stroud more closely approximated the kinds of
sentencing judgments to which a jury's nullification
prerogative does not apply. The consequence is that the
jury's original verdict of life imprisonment in Bullington
may be regarded as an implicit acquittal of the more
onerous verdict of death and, thus, is "absolutely final,"7
even if later determined to be erroneous.
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The Defendant's Interest in Repose
Bullington also differs from Pearce (as well as Stroud)
with respect to the defendant's interest in repose. The
argument for repose is to be distinguished from the
argument regarding "implicit acquittals." The acquittal rule
is a reflection of the jury's unreviewable authority to
dispense mercy and is apparently absolute, operating even
if the jury's verdict is otherwise erroneous. The rule of
repose, in contrast, is not tied to the jury: it is a principle of
res judicata, applicable to proceedings terminating in
mistrials, dismissals and convictions (as well as acquittals).
Moreover, as a principle of res judicata, the rule of
repose is not an absolute: it seeks instead to strike a balance
between the state 's interest in having a fair opportunity to
make its case and the defendant's interest in not having to
relitigate something that has or should have been fully
litigated before. Thus, the prosecution may appeal
erroneous pretrial and post-verdict rulings in a defendant's
favor, may appeal erroneous sentences in his favor , and
may retry a defendant following a reversed conviction; yet
it may not try a defendant on an issue that was fully
adjudicated against it in an earlier proceeding, or retry a

circumstances; in that event, ordinary rules of res judicata
do not apply-no more than they do to the rehearing of
continuing civil injunctions. The state in Pearce, however,
was not such a jurisdiction. It did not use indeterminate
sentences or generally subject sentences to continual
reassessment. All sentences were fixed at the close of trial
once and for all , except for a few defendants (like Pearce)
who were unfortunate enough to be reconvicted following
successful appeals.
The real reason the rule of repose did not apply in Pearce
is that the resentencing there was not re litigation as
ordinarily understood. The prosecution in Pearce was not
asking for a "second bite at the apple" in the form of a
separate hearing with adversary proof, instructions, and
burden of proof under specific sentencing standards.
Rather, the prosecution was asking that the trial judge be
allowed at the conclusion of trial to impose a sentence that
was in accord with the evidence already before him by
virtue of its having been introduced on the issue of guilt or
innocence. To have ruled otherwise in Pearce would have
required the sentencing judge to blind himself to probative
evidence already before him by adhering to a previous

The prosecution in
Pearce was not
asking for a "second
bite of the apple" . ..

defendant following a mistrial declared in bad faith over
his objection or following a conviction reversed for simple
insufficiency of evidence. Essentially, the prosecution is
entitled to "one fair opportunity to offer whatever proof it
[can) assemble" in a "trial free from error," but it is not
otherwise entitled to a "second bite at the apple. "e
To see how Bullington differs from Pearce for purposes of
the rule of repose, one must first understand why the state
in Pearce was allowed to relitigate the defendant's sentence
after it had already had one fair, error-free opportunity to
secure an appropriate sentence at the original trial. The
reason was not that the prevailing law had changed in the
meantime in the form of new sentencing standards, because
the defendant in Pearce wait resentenced by the same trial
judge applying the same sentencing standards as were
applied originally.
Nor was it that the prevailing law prescribed "continuing
sentencing" based on changing circumstances. True , some
jurisdictions do employ rehabilitative sentencing standards
tied to continuing assessments of a defendant's changing

sentence that might have nothing to do with the facts as he
then understood them to be.
Bullington, on the other hand, is a paradigm of res
judicata. The prosecution there is not asking that the trial
jury be allowed to impose a sentence in accord with
probative evidence that will independently be before it on
the matter of guilt or innocence. Rather, the prosecution is
asking to be allowed to present adversary proofs in a de
nova proceeding before a jury to be instructed under
independent standards of law-all for the purpose of
relitigating historical facts that the prosecution had already
fully and fairly litigated once before.
Consequently, unless the prosecution in Bullington has
preserved a sufficient objection to the exclusion of women
from the original jury, it should be precluded by
constitutional rules of repose from seeking a "second bite of
the apple."
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* * * * * * * * * *
I suggested at the start that we might learn from
Bullington something about legal rules and, hence, about
legal education. If ever there has been a rule of criminal
procedure that we all assumed we understood, it is the
double jeopardy rule of Pearce, that a defendant who is
reconvicted following a successful appeal may be given a
greater sentence than he originally received. Now
Bullington comes along and reveals that those of us whose
knowledge of law consists of hornbook rules know less than
we thought we did . For however Bullington is eventually
decided, the very granting of certiorari shows that the
Pearce rule-like all legal "rules"-is elusive; that the real
meaning of Pearce inheres in the balance of constitutional
values it reflects; that if a school can teach its students how
to identify and analyze such values, it can largely dispense
with hornbook rules; and that if a school does not equip its
students with skills of analysis, no amount of learned rules
will do them much good.
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